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DISCOVERY CONTAINMENT REDUX
RICHARD L. MARCUS *
Here we go again. In a sense, this century's efforts at procedural
reform can be traced to Roscoe Pound's famous speech about popular
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice at the 1906 American
Bar Association convention in St. Paul.' But broad discovery was miss-
ing from Pound's world, and today's push toward discovery contain-
ment can be more properly traced to the 1976 Pound Conference
convened to commemorate and reflect on the 70th anniversary of the
original speech.2 That conference did deal significantly with discovery
problems, and since 1976, proposals for amendment to the rules have
generally involved retreats from the broadest concept of discovery—
in essence to try to contain the genie of broad discovery without
killing it.
Those who would carry these efforts forward need to know about
the work of the last twenty years. Accordingly, this Article chronicles
that recent history. 3 It is based on published materials and the files of
the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (the "Committee"). Al-
though one could presumably exhume more detail about this history,
these sources should suffice for present purposes. To set the scene, this
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
Although I ant serving as Special Reporter to the Advisory Committee in connection with its study
of discovery, the views set forth in this Article are mine only, and do not represent the views of
the Committee or arty of its members. I am indebted to Cari Pinkowski, Hastings class of 1999,
for research assistance.
I See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofjustice, 29
REP. OF THE A.B.A. 395 (1906). Dean Wigmore recalled 20 years later that the speech "struck the
spark that kindled the white flame of high endeavor, now spreading through the entire legal
profession . ." John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address of 1906, 20 J. Am. Jun. Soc.
176, 176 (1936). In his address at the 1976 Pound Conference, Chief Justice Burger called
Pound's speech "the first truly comprehensive, critical analysis of American justice." Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D,—A Need for Systemic Anticipation, Keynote Address at
the 1976 Pound Conference (Apr. 9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 83, 83 (1976). For a catalogue of Pound's
contributions in the general area, see Austin W. Scott, Pound's Influence on Civil Procedure, 78
Hisasr. L, REV. 1568 (1965).
2 This conference was sponsored by the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Con-
ference of Chief Justices and the American Bar Association. See generally Addresses Delivered at
the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976) in, 70 F.R.D. 79-246 (1976).
3 For another such survey of the amendment activity of the 1970s and 1980s, see Arthur R.
Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 Hmtv, L. REV. 428,
453-63 (1991).
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Article begins with a description of the way things were twenty years
ago and then examines the two major rounds of discovery containment
that have already occurred. Reflecting on these two rounds, it also
offers some insights that may be pertinent to the third round that lies
before us.
I. THE WAY THINGS WERE
In a sense, the 1970 amendments to the rules completed what one
could call a cultural cycle in American procedural reform, a cycle that
could be traced back to Pound (and before him to Field),'' and which
was characterized by increased relaxation and expansion of procedure.
This generalization overlooks many counter-tendencies, and after the
highwater mark in 1970 those competing tendencies became ascen-
dent. But before turning to them it is useful to sketch the landscape.
Much as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure broke new ground
in allowing broad discovery, they did not, as adopted in 1938, make it
entirely open. Document discovery, in particular, was until 1946 subject
to a narrow scope permitting discovery of documents "which constitute
or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action," and
until 1970 available only on motion based on .a showing of "good
cause."5 More generally, the rules provided separately for the different
discovery devices rather than combining coverage of general provi-
sions concerning relevancy and the like
In 1963, the Advisory Committee began what it described as "the
first comprehensive review of the discovery rules undertaken since
1938.'7 The work produced a draft set of proposed amendments four
years later. During that time, the Project for Effective Justice of Colum-
bia Law School conducted an extensive field survey of discovery (the
"Columbia Survey") 8 that led the Committee to conclude that "there
is no empirical evidence to warrant a fundamental change in the
philosophy of the discovery rules."8 Accordingly, the 1970 amendments
rearranged the rules and, to some extent, expanded their availability,
1 See Stephen Suhrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 709 (1998).
5 8A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2201 (2d ed. 1994)
[hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROC.EDURE].
6 See generally 8 id. § 2003.
7 Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Discovery
Rules, in Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery,
48 F.R.D. 487 app. at 487 (1970) [hereinafter Advisory Committee].
8 For a report of the results of the Columbia Survey, see WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968).
9 Advisory Committee, supra note 7, at 489.
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including elimination of the requirement for a motion to obtain docu-
ment production and of the "good cause" standard for production of
documents.'° It also made other changes generally relaxing the opera-
tion of the discovery rules."
Party-controlled discovery reached its high-water mark in the 1970
amendments in terms of rule provisions. As the Columbia Survey had
demonstrated, "fdliscovery has become an integral part of litigation." 12
It. might even be argued that broad discovery put pressure on the
substantive law to expand as well. Thus Dean Friedenthal contended
as follows in 1981:
[O]ver the years developments in areas such as products
liability, employment discrimination, and consumer protec-
tion have been the result at least partly of broad-ranging
discovery provisions. For example, lawyers would not have
pushed in the courts and in the legislatures for expanded
causes of action hinged on proof that defendants knew or
should have known of a product's danger, if such proof were
normally unavailable. The ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to
obtain a corporate defendant's records, to depose corporate
employees, and to send searching interrogatories has had a
substantial impact in particular areas of law, and is one im-
portant factor in the dramatic increase in cases filed. 13
It seems undeniable that broad discovery has benefitted plaintiffs
attempting to prove certain types of claims by enabling them to obtain
both "smoking guns" and less inflammatory but critical evidence." The
great importance of discovery to some plaintiffs is obvious. Incidents
le See id. at 526 (describing one "major change" of amendments as "to eliminate the require-
ment of good cause").
II The Advisory Committee's introduction to this package of amendments also identified the
following changes: (1) making insurance policies discoverable and thereby resolving a pre-exist-
ing dispute about the question; (2) providing by rule for the handling of work product and expert
information; (3) allowing interrogatories and requests for admissions to seek matters of opinion;
(4) directing that answers and objections he served together; (5) putting the burden on the party
seeking discovery rather than the objector to seek court intervention; and (6) tightening sanc-
tions. See id. at 487-88. See generally 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 2003.1.
For au attack on the "radical changes" made by the 1970 amendments, sec George M. Vetter,
Changes Ahead in the Federal Rules, 56 AIM. J. 568 (1970). Among other things, Vetter observes
that "fwlith the good cause requirement of Rule 34 gone, practically everything becomes discov-
erable." Id. at 571.
12 GLASER, supra note 8, at 51.
" Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REV. 806, 818 (1981).
14 See, e.g., MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS
TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 15 (1996). Professor Green explains that plaintiffs' attorneys in
product liability cases rely on "civil discovery . . . [as] their best hope of obtaining information
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involving efforts to purge corporate files to remove potentially harmful
evidence provide further support for the conclusion that discovery
unearths such evidence. 16 One of the striking things about American
discovery is that parties often do reveal damaging information, and the
importance of that discovered material in litigation cannot be over-
stated. It would be wrong, however, to believe that discovery only
benefits plaintiffs. To the contrary, the Columbia Survey concluded
that "[djiscovery is less profitable for plaintiffs than defendants,"' 6
although that conclusion seemed to be geared to garden-variety cases.' 7
Courts have come to recognize the centrality of broad discovery
in providing evidentiary support for certain kinds of cases. As the
Second Circuit stated in holding that a district judge improperly de-
nied a plaintiff discovery:
Because employers rarely leave a paper trail---or "smoking
gun"—attesting to a discriminatory intent, disparate treat-
ment plaintiffs often must build their cases from pieces of cir-
cumstantial evidence which cumulatively undercut the credi-
bility of the various explanations offered by the employer.' 8
Indeed, on one level one could say that certain types of discrimina-
tion claims are only possible with such discovery. As the Fifth Circuit
put it in 1973:
Our wide experience with cases involving racial discrimina-
tion in education, employment, and other segments of society
have led us to rely heavily in Title VII cases on the empirical
data which show an employer's overall pattern of conduct in
determining whether he has discriminated against particular
individuals or a class as a whole.' 9
that would reveal whether their clients had meritorious claims and, if so, provide the evidence
to enable their clients to prevail." Id. Professor Green illustrates: "In asbestos litigation, plaintiffs'
lawyers obtained more and more memoranda, correspondence, scientific studies, and testimony
of industry officials that demonstrated the industry's awareness of the hazards of asbestos and
their acts to suppress that information." Id.
15 See, e.g., Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 481 (S.D. Fla. 1984), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 775 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1985) (purge of files for the stated purpose of eliminating
documents that would be detrimental to Piper in a lawsuit).
In GLASER, supra note 8, at 90.
17 See id. at 85 (reporting that the advantages of discovery for defendants were most pro-
nounced in auto tort cases, where the plaintiff knows the basic facts).
18 Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted)
(holding that the district court in an age discrimination action improperly refused to require the
employer to disclose the name of every person over 40 terminated during a six-year period).
to Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Sweat v. Miller
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Whether broad discovery has had considerable impact on the
content of substantive law is debatable. Employment discrimination
cases provide some support for finding such an impact, for the Su-
preme Court has twice invoked the existence of broad discovery as
pertinent to its handling of substantive issues of employment discrimi-
nation law. In 1989, it held that plaintiffs must demonstrate that chal-
lenged employment practices actually caused racial imbalances in the
workplace. 2° It rejected arguments that this was unfair by pointing to
discovery: "Some will complain that this specific causation requirement
is unduly burdensome on Title VII plaintiffs. But liberal civil discovery
rules give plaintiffs broad access to employers' records in an effort to
document their claims."21 Similarly, when the Supreme Court placed
on the employee the burden of rebutting the employer's nondiscrimi-
natory justification, it observed that its ruling would not "unduly hin-
der the plaintiff," invoking "the liberal discovery rules applicable to
any civil suit in federal court." 22 Thus, the very structure of employment
discrimination law seems to have been founded partly on the availabil-
ity of broad discovery.
Making a similar claim for other areas of law is both problematic
and beyond the scope of this Article. Certainly it could be that common
law breakthroughs occur because parties obtain evidence through dis-
covery that moves judges to modify the law in their favor—a variant of
the old saw about hard cases making bad law. But in at least one
important area mentioned by Dean Friedenthal, it is not clear that this
sort of evolution has occurred. Much as discovery may be crucial for
product liability plaintiffs to prove their cases, it does not seem to have
had an important influence on the evolution of that law. To the con-
trary, modern doctrine seems ordinarily to be the work of judges
dealing with abstract legal issues little dependent on broad discovery."
Brewing Co., 708 F.2(1 655, 658 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Statistical information concerning an em-
ployer's general policy and practice concerning minority employment may be relevant to a
showing of pretext, even in a case alleging an individual instance of discrimination rather than
a 'pattern and practice' of discrimination . . . .''); Lineen v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., No. 96 Civ.
2718(11B) (MHD) 1997 WL 73763, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1997) ("discovery may be important
to develop data reflecting the intent behind the defendant's employment decisions and suggest-
ing whether the defendant's justification for its challenged actions is pretextual").
2" See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonic), 490 U.S. 042, 657-58 (1989). In the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Congress arguably codified this feature of Wards Cove, but there is debate on the impact
of the statutory provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A)(i) (1994).
21 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The Court added that employers are required to maintain
records that would provide the sort of information needed to prove causation. See id. at 657-58.
22 Texas Dep'l of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981). The Court also
pointed out that the claimant would have access to the investigative file compiled by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. See id.
23 For example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., the court said that "[t]he facts arc
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More significantly, the adoption of section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts, which prompted much further legal development facilitating
plaintiffs' claims, 24
 hardly turned on the fruit of discovery; some view
it as the work of a cabal of law professors. 25
Besides substantive impact, however, it is important also to men-
tion that broad discovery has assumed a prominent role in facilitating
trial preparation. As reflected in the 1993 addition of Rule 26(a) (3),
many districts require that parties provide detailed information about
trial exhibits and witnesses through the final pretrial process. The
handling of the trial itself thus assumes considerable pretrial familiarity
with the evidence. Indeed, the discovery rules did not on their face
take account of the assumptions about discovery underlying the han-
dling of trials until 1993, when Rule 26(b) (4) was amended to author-
ize depositions of expert witnesses as a matter of right. The Federal
Rules of Evidence, however, had long allowed an expert witness to state
a conclusion without providing its factual predicate on the assumption
that full discovery could be had before tria1. 26
Much as discovery had thus become central to American litiga-
tion, it. is equally clear that very broad opposition to the liberality of
discovery grew in the early 1970s. Many complained that the rule
amendments of the 1960s created procedural tools that eclipsed, or
even subverted, the substantive law." Furious attacks were levelled at
class actions in the wake of the 1966 amendment, as Professor Arthur
Miller has chronicled. 28
 But the breadth of activity concerning discov-
ery, starting with the Pound Conference, is even more striking. That
conference led directly to the creation of a Special Committee on
not complicated" in holding that a disclaimer in small print did not overcome an implied
warranty. 161 A.2d 69, 73 (N.J. 1960). Similarly, in Greenman II Yuba Power Prod., Inc., the court
upheld strict liability in a case in which plaintiffs proof of a defect seemed to have come from
expert witnesses and not to have relied on discovery. 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963).
In the words of one leading torts casebook, "Islection 402A has literally swept the country."
WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 718 (8th ed. 1988).
25 See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the. Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 141. LEGAL STUD. 461, 464-65 (1985).
26 See FED. It EVIL'. 705 (stating that the hypothetical question is no longer necessary). The
Advisory Committee Note explains that this provision "assumes the cross-examiner has the
advance knowledge which is essential for effective cross-examination" through discovery. FED. R.
EvID. 705 advisory committee's. note.
" See, e.g., Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 CoLum. L. REV. 299, 300 (1980); Milton
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits: The Twenty-Third
Annual Antitrust Review, 71 GoLum. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1971).
28
 See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
"Class Action Problem, "92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979).
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Discovery by the American Bar Association ("ABA") Section of Litiga-
tion, as explained in the next section. It was also followed by the
creation of several other groups as well, including: the Discovery Abuse
Committee of the National Conference of Special Court Judges, the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Civil Discovery Committee,
a Special Advisory Committee on Discovery of the Conference of
Metropolitan Chief Judges and the Arizona State University Discovery
Conference. In addition, in creating the National Commission on
Revision of the Antitrust Laws, President Carter directed it to consider
"revision of discovery practices in order to limit expensive and time-
consuming inquiry into areas not germane to contested issues." 29 Both
the Second Circuit and the Eighth Circuit devoted all or part of the
programs at their respective judicial conferences to litigation cost and
discovery in 1976 and 1977." Finally, in 1982 there was a National
Conference on Discovery Reform sponsored by the ABA Section of
Litigation.3 ' Such pervasive concern about discovery abuse is striking
from twenty years' remove, and was sufficient to fuel two rounds of
rule changes designed to contain discovery.
THE FIRST ROUND OF DISCOVERY CONTAINMENT: THE WAKE OF
THE POUND CONFERENCE
Barely a month after the Pound Conference, the Advisory Com-
mittee received a report on the Conference emphasizing concerns
about discovery and the Chief Justice's assurance that the Committee
would hold hearings on "any proposals the legal profession considers
appropriate."' The conferees themselves formed a Follow-Up Task
Force to carry forward the work," and the Task Force recommended
that the ABA Section of Litigation accord discovery a high priority. 34
The Section of Litigation in turn formed a Special Committee on
"Exec. Order No. 12,022, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,441 § 2(1) (iii) (1977).
"These are mentioned in a letter from Hon. Walter Mansfield, Chair, Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules to John P. Frank, Lewis and Roca 2 (June 29, 1978) (on file with author).
n See Proceedings of the National Conference on Discovery Reform, 3 REV. LITIG. 1 -221.
32 Agenda for the Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (May 17, 1976) (on file
with author). Item 2 on the agenda was a report on the Pound Conference. See id,
33 The members of the Task Force were Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Chairman, Hon. William H.
Erickson, Jane L. Frank, Francis R. Kirkham, Hon. Wade H. McCree, Prof. Maurice Rosenberg
and Hon. Walter V. Schaelim See Report of the Pound Conference Follow-up Task Force, 74 F.R.D,
159, 164 (1976) [hereinafter Report of the Pound Conference Task Force],
34 See William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for thejudicial
System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1977); Report of the Pound Conference Task
Force, supra note 33, at 171.
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Abuse of Discovery" (hereinafter the "ABA Special Committee") to
study the problems and report back its recommendations.
The ABA Special Committee embarked on a review of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in August 1976," and by April 1977, it had
presented its tentative recommendations to the Conference of Metro-
politan Chief Judges.37 As eventually issued by the Special Committee
and officially approved by the ABA Board of Governors in December
1977, the proposals had three main ingredients: (1) narrowing the
scope of discovery to material "relevant to the issues raised by the
claims or defenses of any party" 38; (2) providing that after "joinder of
issue" the court should hold a discovery conference if requested by any
party"; and (3) limiting interrogatories to thirty. 4° As later explained
55
 The members of the Committee were Joseph A. Ball, Chair, Barbara A. Babcock, Hun.
Fred M. Winner, Hon. Warren J. Ferguson, W. Robert Brown, Richard C. Casey, Philip H. COI'boy,
Morton R. Galane, Peter Gruenbcrger, Robert F. Hanley, Weyinan I. Lundquist, William J.
Manning, George B. Mickum III, Edward W. Mullenix, Ronald L. Olson, Louis Paisley, Walter A.
Steele, John A. Tomlinson, and Steven M. Umin. See Special Committee on Abuse of Discovery,
Report to the Bench and Bar, 92 F.R.D. 137 app. at 153-54 (1977).
"As explained in its Report to the Bench and Bar, the Special Committee decided:
to consider only revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the Pound
Conference Follow-Up Task Force Report did not confine its criticism of discovery
practice to the federal court system, the Committee fell that if it were able to
undertake successfully a revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it would
have created a model from which further efforts could be directed to state rules.
Id. at 152-53.
37 Thus, the Advisory Committee files contain drafts of the proposals eventually offered by
the Special Committee to narrow the scope of discovery and add provisions for a discovery
conference called by a party. See Letter from William E. Foley, Secretary, to Hon. Elbert P. Tuttle,
United States Senior Circuit Judge (Apr. 21, 1977) (on file with author) (relaying "proposals for
changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure submitted by lawyers making a presentation on
the abuses of discovery to the Conference of Metropolitan Chief District Judges meeting at
Cannel, California on April 18 and 19").
38 Specifically, the Special Committee recommended that Rule 26(b) (1) he amended as
follows:
(I) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the
it relates to the issues raised by the, elaim-er-defelme claims or defenses of the
any party=
inc-hiding The discovery may include the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things; and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter; and
the oral testimony of witnesses,
 It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,
92 F.R.D. at 157.
59 See id. at 159,
4° See id. at 173. The Special Committee also proposed other changes. See id. at 165-66
(amending Rule 30 to allow non-stenographic recording of depositions); W. at 177 (amending
Rule 34 to require that a party producing documents do so either as kept in the usual course of
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by the Chair of the Section of Litigation, who was also a member of
the ABA Special Committee, that Committee viewed these three as the
key ingredients to its proposa1. 4 '
In November 1977, Attorney General Bell, who had been the
Chair of the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, wrote that these
proposals were "a welcome response," and added that "I am particu-
larly pleased with the proposed change to Rule 26 which narrows the
scope of discovery to the 'issues raised.'" 12 In addition, the Attorney
General directed the Department of Justice's Office for Improvements
in the Administration of Justice to "undertake a careful review of the
entire discovery process with a view toward determining whether addi-
tional changes should be accomplished."43 In early January 1978, As-
sistant Attorney General Daniel Meador, head of that office, wrote to
Judge Tuttle, Chair of the Advisory Committee, to update the judge
on review of the ABA Special Committee proposals at the Department
of Justice and relay his views that the Department was "pleased that the
committee is moving ahead to consider the salutary proposals" and to
express the "hope that every effort will be made to expedite considera-
tion and adoption of changes along these lines."" Mr. Meador also
enclosed a memorandum from his staff outlining ideas that the Advi-
sory Committee might consider. 45
business, or labeled to correspond with the requests); id. at 178-79 (amending Rule 37 to
authorize sanctions for unjustified discovery).
41 See Prepared Statement of William J. Manning on Behalf of the Section of Litigation of
the American Bar Association, attached to Letter from William J. Manning, Special Committee
Member and Chair, ABA Section of Litigation, to Hon. Walter R. Mansfield, Second Circuit
United States Court of Appeals 3 (Sept. 22, 1978) (on file with author).
42 Leiter from Griffin Bell, United States Attorney General, to William J. Manning, Chair,
ABA Section of Litigation 1 (Nov. 4, 1977) (on file with author).
45 Id. at 2.
44 Letter from Daniel J. Meador, Assistant United States Attorney General, to Hon. Elbert P.
Tuttle, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 1 (Jan. 6, 1978) (on file with author).
45 Mr. Meador emphasized that the memorandum did not represent the formal position of
the Department. See id. It suggested further measures, including; (1) allowing the judge to call
a discovery conference, or providing by local rule that such a conference be held in each case;
(2) forbidding discovery until a responsive pleading is filed or a conference with the court is
held; and (3) strengthening supplementation requirements. See United States Dcp't of Justice,
Office of Improvements in the Admin. of Justice, Comments on Proposed Discovery Rules
Changes Promulgated by the ABA's Section of Litigation in December 1977 (fan. 6, 1978),
attached to Letter from Daniell Meador to Hon. Elbert P. Tuttle, supra note 44.
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A. The 1980 Amendments—Flirting with Changing the Scope of
Discovery
Against this background, the Advisory Committee met in January
1978 and moved rapidly toward implementing all three of the ABA
Special Committee's central recommendations. From the outset, the
Reporter, Professor Bernard Ward, opposed the revision of the scope
of discovery." At a minimum, he cautioned that attempting to limit
discovery to "issues" would be undesirable, and he proposed instead
that if the Committee went forward with narrowing the scope of dis-
covery it should do so in terms of claims or defenses." Neither did the
Reporter favor a numerical limitation on interrogatories." He did,
however, favor the addition of the discovery conference, with the hope
that its use would be restricted to complex cases. 49
The members of the Advisory Committee debated the choice
between Professor Ward's language on the scope of discovery and the
ABA Special Committee's version, eventually voting to propose Profes-
sor Ward's version." The Committee also decided to proceed with the
discovery conference. After much debate, however, the Committee
decided not to adopt a national limit on the number of interrogatories
and chose instead to propose that any district court could by a majority
vote limit the number of interrogatories. 5 '
The resulting Preliminary Draft of proposed amendments 52 in-
vited "the responses of the bench and bar to the points of disagreement
46
 In his pre-meeting memorandum to the members of the Committee, Ward concluded that
"the change is unwise" and that it would lead to "endless wrangling." Memorandum from Bernard
Ward, Advisory Committee Reporter, to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Agenda Item One
3 (Jan. 12-13, 1978) (on file with author). At the meeting, he said the change "is purely
psychological and does not change anything," Minutes of the Jan. 12, 1978 Meeting of the
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules 3 (Jan. 12, 1978) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Minutes of Jan. 12, 1978 Meeting].
47 "I do not favor such a change. I simply prefer it to the term 'issues.'" Memorandum from
Bernard Ward to Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 46, at 4.
48 See id. at 21-22.
49 See Minutes of Jan. 12, 1978 Meeting, supra note 46, at 6.
56 See id. at 3-5.
51 See id. at 13-15.
52 See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
77 F.R.D. 613 (1978). The Advisory Committee notes cited the ABA Special Committee report
and stated that "[t]he Advisory Committee is deeply grateful for the work of the Section of
Litigation, and several of the changes it proposed are incorporated in the proposed amend-
ments." Id. at 626.
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between it and the Section of Litigation." 53 The Committee was notably
agnostic regarding its proposal for narrowing the scope of discovery: 54
The Committee doubts that replacing one very general
term with another equally general one will prevent abuse
occasioned by the generality of language. Further, it fears that
the introduction of a new term in the place of a familiar one
will invite unnecessary litigation over the significance of the
change. As the [ABA Special Committee] Report notes, "De-
termining when discovery spills beyond 'issues' and into 'sub-
ject matter' will not be easy. Nevertheless, the Committee
recommends the change if only to direct courts not to con-
tinue the present practice of erring on the side of expansive
discovery."
If the term "subject matter" does in fact persuade courts to
err "on the side of expansive discovery," it should be elimi-
nated, and that is the course recommended by the Commit-
tee. 55
Besides proposing a new Rule 26(f) containing the ABA Special
Committee's recommendation on the discovery conference and auth-
orizing districts to limit the number of interrogatories, the draft also
included other recommendations made by the ABA Special Commit-
tee, including videotaping of depositions and the addition of a pro-
vision to Rule 37 that would authorize sanctions against parties who
make unreasonable discovery requests. 57
55 Id. at 627.
54 As proposed by the Advisory Committee in 1978, Rule 26(b) (I) would be amended as
follows:
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the
it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is
not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the
trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
Id. at 623-24.
55 Id. at 627-28.
56 See id. at 631-32.
57 See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra
note 52, at 652-53,
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Eventually there were numerous responses to the Advisory Com-
mittee's invitation for comment. 58
 Professor Charles Alan Wright ques-
tioned whether there was any need for narrowing the scope of discov-
ery, saying that "[n] either the Section [of Litigation] nor the Advisory
Committee offers a scintilla of proof that the term 'subject matter' does
in fact persuade courts to err on the side of expansion of discovery." 59
John Frank wrote that he agreed with Professor Wright about the
change in the scope of discovery, adding that he had questioned many
lawyers but could find none who felt that the rewording of the scope
of discovery would make any difference. 60
 The Arizona State University
Discovery Conference later reported that the luminaries 6' assembled
by Mr. Frank and judge Schroeder to discuss the proposal voted against
it. 62
 On the other hand, the Attorney General criticized the Advisory
Committee for not going far enough in restricting discovery. 65
 Others
divided on the central proposal regarding scope of discovery. 64 As
58
 At the initial meeting to discuss the Special Committee's proposals, in January 1978, judge
Tuttle began the discussion by announcing that any recommended changes would be circulated
to the bench and bar promptly enough to be reviewed in light of the comments received by the
anticipated June meeting of the Committee. See Minutes ofJan. 12, 1978 Meeting, supra note 46,
at 1-2.
There was much chafing over the brief time the Committee allowed for comment. For
example, Professor Charles Alan Wright expressed surprise that the time for comment was so
brief, noting that he had received the proposals only a week before and that the Committee's
deadline allowed "far too short a period to obtain responsible reaction from the profession."
Letter from Charles Alan Wright, Professor, University of Texas at Austin School of Law, to
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1 (May 5, 1978) (on file with author). John Frank
and Judge Mary Schroeder asked for more time to comment so that the Ad Hoc Committee on
Discovery Reform (later the Arizona State Discovery Conference) could prepare input. See
Memorandum from John P. Frank and Hon. Mary Schroeder to the Ad Hoc Committee on
Discovery 1 (May 26, 1978) (on file with author).
Eventually the Committee decided to extend the comment period and also to hold hearings,
evidently the first time it had held hearings on proposed rule amendments.
59
 Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra
note 58, at 4.
6° See Letter from John P. Frank, Lewis and Roca, to Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure 1 (May 8, 1978) (on file with author).
61
 The participants were Peter Anderson, Joseph Ball, Hugo Black,,l1r., Dean Paul Carrington,
Richard Chernick, Professor Edward Cooper, Albert jenner, Hull. Frank Kaufman, Samuel
Langerman, Robert Mills, Edward Mullinix, Robert Murphy, Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Hon.
Alvin Rubin and Kenneth Sherk. See Arizona State Univ. Discovery Conference, Report on the
Advisory Committee's Proposed Revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure 3-4 (Nov. 1978) (on file
with author).
62
 See id. at 9-12. According to the report, the eventual vote was 10 to 6 against the proposal.
See id. at 10. There was also a discussion of deleting the last sentence of Rule 26(b), which "was
rejected by an almost unanimous vote." Id.
85 See Letter from Griffin B. Bell, United States Attorney General, to Hon. Roszel Thomsen,
Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the judicial Conference of the United
States 1 (June 27, 1978) (on file with author).
64 See, e.g., Arizona State Univ. Discovery Conference, supra note 61, at 9-12 (opposing
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tabulated by Judge Mansfield, Chair of the Committee, forty individu-
als and five bar groups opposed any change, five individuals or groups
approved of the Committee's tentative draft, and eight individuals or
groups endorsed the ABA Special Committee's proposal. 65 Professor
Wright concluded that he empathized with the Committee's position:
I recognize the difficult position that the Civil Rules Com-
mittee and its distinguished Chairman and Reporter were in.
The ABA Section had come up with a series of ill-considered
proposals. Before the ink was dry on these they had the
endorsement of the Chief Justice and the Attorney General.
The Committee must have felt under great pressure to take
prompt action in these respects. It has minimized, so far as it
felt able, the damage that the Section's proposals would have
caused, but even so it has given us hasty solutions to what may
or may not be problems."
In January 1979, having received this input, the Advisory Commit-
tee decided to withdraw its proposal to narrow the scope of discovery
and its proposal to authorize districts to limit the number of interroga-
tories, and in their place it circulated a more modest set of proposals
for further comment.° In its comments, it explained that it "believes
that abuse of discovery, while very serious in certain cases, is not so
general as to require such basic changes."" In February 1979, the ABA
Special Committee issued a long memorandum supporting its original
change in Rule 26(b)(1)); Committee on Fed. Courts of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.,
Report on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2-3 (Oct. 12, 1978)
(on file with author) (favoring Advisory Committee version over ABA Special Committee pro-
posal); Discovery Abuse Comm. of Nat'l Conference of Special Court Judges and the Liaison
Comm. of the Nat'l Council of U.S. Magistrates, Comments on the Preliminary Draft of the
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3 {June 27, 1978) (on file with
author) (preferring reference to "issues" rather than "claim or defense"); Ninth Circuit Ad Hoc
Civil Discovery Comm., Report of Ninth Circuit Ad Hoc Civil Discovery Committee, Ninth Circuit
Judicial Conference, 9-10 (June 1978) (on file with author) (favoring ABA Special Committee's
focus on "issues"); Report to the President and Attorney General of the National Commission for the
Review of the Antitrust Laws and Procedures, 80 FWD. 509, 547-48 (1979) (favoring narrowed
scope of discover y).
See Memorandum from Hon. Walter Mansfield, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
to Hon, Roszel Thomsen, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (June 14, 1979),, reprinted in 85 F.R.D. 521 app. at 542 (1980).
66 Letter from Charles Alan Wright to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
supra note 58, at 6.
67 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of thefudicial Conference of the U.S.,
Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80
F.R.D. 323 (1979).
66 Id. at 332. It also dropped the proposals for non-stenographic reporting of depositions,
and the proposed change to Rule 37 to authorize sanctions for initiation of discovery. Judge
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proposals and denouncing the revised amendments as too cautious. 69
The amendments nevertheless went forward in 1980. Justice Powell (a
former President of the ABA), joined by Justices Stewart and Rehn-
quist, dissented on the ground that the amendments did not go far
enough, and that "acceptance of these tinkering changes will delay for
years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms.""
B. The 1983 Amendments—The Shift to Case Management and
Proportionality
Justice Powell need not have worried, for even before he issued
his dissent the seeds of more aggressive changes were being sown.
Shortly after the Supreme Court promulgated the 1980 amendments
over Justice Powell's objection, Judge Walter Mansfield, Chair of the
Advisory Committee, met with representatives of the ABA Section of
Litigation and informed them that further amendments dealing with
Mansfield, Chair of the Committee, later explained the decision not to proceed with narrowing
the scope of discovery as follows:
Comments received in response to the Preliminary Draft were generally opposed
to any change in Rule 26(b)(1). Many believe the present rule is working well. A
number disputed the assumption that there was general abuse of discovery. Others
believe that abuse is limited to big or complex cases, which represent a small
percentage of all litigation and can be better managed through use of the Manual
for Complex Litigation, which is specially designed to deal with discovery in such
cases. It was thought that a change in language would lead to endless disputes and
uncertainty about the meaning of the terms "issues" and "claims or defenses." It
was objected that discovery could not be restricted to issues because one of the
purposes of discovery was to determine issues (e.g., in wrongful death, product
liability and medical malpractice suits). Many commentators feared that if discovery
were restricted to issues or claims or defenses there would be a return to detailed
pleading or a resort to "shotgun" pleading, with multitudes of issues, claims and
defenses, leading to an increase in discovery motions without any reduction in
discovery. Some suggested that the better way of avoiding abuse of discovery would
be to increase judicial supervision from the outset, fixing limits on the time and
extent of discovery to be permitted according to the needs of each case.
Memorandum from Hon. Walter Mansfield to Hon. Roszel Thomsen, supra note 65, at 541.
69 See Special Comm. for the Study of Discovery Abuse, ABA Section of Litig., Memorandum
in Support of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Feb. 1979) (on
file with author). Compare id, with Memorandum from Federal Courts Committee, State Bar of
California, to the Board of Governors of the California State Bar 3-4 (Apr. 25, 1979) (on file with
author) (applauding abandonment of changes to scope of discovery).
"Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting) Justice Powell's words echo the dissenting views of the ABA Special Committee:
Mindful that the rules which are ultimately adopted will likely govern discovery
proceedings for the next decade, we urge the Advisory Committee to give further
consideration to the amendments initially proposed and to other ways by which
discovery abuse can be deterred and the expense of civil litigation can be reduced.
Special Comm., Comments on Revised Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, quoted in Memorandum from Professor Bernard Ward to the Chairman and Members
of the Committee on Civil Rules 1 (May 25, 1979) (on file with author).
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discovery were contemplated in the near future. In view of these
assurances, the Chair of the Section said it was "prepared to acquiesce
now in the adoption of interim measures pending priority considera-
tion of such studies and additional remedial measures."71 Thereafter,
the President of the ABA wrote to Senator Edward Kennedy, the Chair
of the Senate judiciary Committee, to report that even though the ABA
agreed with Justice Powell's dissent, given Judge Mansfield's assur-
ances, the ABA did not believe Congress should intervene to prevent
the pending amendments from taking effect. 72
Meanwhile, the ABA Special Committee issued a Second Report,
reflecting "our committee's judgment that the 1980 amendments to
the discovery rules, while making important improvements, were an
insufficient response to a serious problem."" Accordingly, the ABA
Special Committee circulated drafts of further proposed amendments
and held "public hearings" on them during the ABA Annual Meeting.
Based on this input, it again urged narrowing the scope of discovery
by removal of the "subject matter" language of Rule 26(b) 74 and im-
posing a thirty-question limit on interrogatories." It also proposed the
addition of a new Rule 26(g) regarding the signing of discovery papers,
making the signature on such a paper a certification of the bona
fides of the positions taken, and authorizing the striking of papers
signed in violation of the rule." It proposed as well that Rule 26(a) be
amended to make the frequency of discovery subject to the limitations
of the proposed Rule 26(g) certification." Addressing a different con-
cern, it proposed amending Rule 30(d) to sanction improper question-
ing during depositions."
71 Letter from Philip Corboy, Chair, ABA Section of Litigation, to Hon. Walter Mansfield,
Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 2 (June 27, 1980) (on file with author) (adding that
the Section was "particularly pleased to note that your committee does not view the present
amendments as closing the book on reform of the discovery process").
72 See Letter from Leonard .Janofsky, President of the ABA, to Hon. Edward M. Kennedy,
Chair, Committee on the judiciary 1-2 (July 9, 1980) (on file with author).
"Special Comm. for the Study of Discovery Abuse, ABA Section of Litig., Second Report of
the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137, 137 (1980) thereinafter
Second Report],
74 See id. at 140.
75 See id. at 145.
76 See id. at 141.
77 See id. at 140.
7s See Second Report, supra note 73, at 144. The Special Committee pointed out that "the
rule does not expressly permit an award of expenses incurred by the deponent confronted with
hour after hour of unjustifiably repetitive questions or questions far beyond the bound of any
arguable relevance." Id. at 144-45. It therefore proposed addition of the following new Rule
30(d) (2):
On motion of a party or of the deponent made at any time during the taking of
the deposition or after the completion of the deposition and upon a showing that
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In fact, the Advisory Committee had long since begun to shift
toward a direction that dovetailed with some of the ABA Special Com-
mittee's objectives. In mid-1979, newly-appointed Reporter Arthur Mil-
ler began his outline of possible issues for the Committee with consid-
eration of expanding Rule 16 to bring that rule "into closer conformity
with current practices relating to pretrial conferences." 7° He suggested
that "rwlork on Rule 16 should be thought of as a natural outgrowth
of the Committee's recent efforts in the discovery context, particularly
the proposal of Rule 26(f)."80 These Rule 16 practices were, of course,
what we now know as case management, a practice that became in-
creasingly prominent in the 1970s. 8' Discussing Reporter Miller's sug-
gestions, the Committee grappled with the extent to which the rules
should direct judges to engage in case management, and tried to
develop methods for identifying complex cases for which this treat-
ment was to be prescribed. 82 It also heard from members of the ABA
Special Committee" and from the Department of Justice. 84
a party, the deponent or an attorney has unreasonably hindered or prolonged the
taking of a deposition, the court shall require the party, deponent or attorney whose
conduct necessitated the motion to pay the moving party the reasonable expenses
incurred by reason of such conduct, including attorney's fees. The court may make
such other orders as arc just. Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent,
the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to snake a
motion for an order. The provisions of Rule 37(a) (4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion.
Id. at 144. Eventually the 1993 amendments added current Rule 30(d) (1) and (2) to address
problems of improper conduct during depositions, but these were more focused on frustration
of the deposition by the attorney representing the witness than improper conduct by the exam-
ining party.
79 Memorandum from Arthur R. Miller, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to
Members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 1 (May 14, 1979) (on file with author) (re:
Agenda for Future Advisory Committee Inquiry).
8° Id. at 2.
81 See, e.g., Robert F, Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding
a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982).
82 See Minutes of the December 1979 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules
1-5 (Dec. 1979) (on file with author).
"See Agenda of the Oct. 2-3, 1980 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 2 (Oct. 1980) (on file with author) (reporting that Weyman Lundquist, Co-Chair
of the ABA Special Committee, would speak in favor of its proposals). After this meeting, the
Rule 26(g) certification requirement, which the Second Report of the ABA Special Committee
had endorsed, was added to the drafts before the Advisory Committee. See Memorandum from
Arthur R. Miller, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Members of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules (Nov. 26, 1980) (on file with author) (attaching Rule 26(g) as a new
matter that "was discussed at length at the last meeting").
84 See. Letter from Maurice Rosenberg, Assistant United States Attorney General, to Hon.
Walter Mansfield, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Sept. 11, 1980) (on file with author)
(enclosing the agenda and minutes of a meeting of an "informal group" consisting of Robert
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In 1981, the Committee circulated a set of proposed amend-
ments85 building on this background that contained a number of fea-
tures not bearing directly on discovery. Most notable of these were a
substantial expansion of Rule 11 and comprehensive revision of Rule
16 to make scheduling orders and further case management much
more prevalen08 It also proposed three changes to Rule 26: (1) delet-
ing the final sentence of Rule 26(a), which had said "[u]nless the court
orders otherwise under subdivision (c) of this rule, the frequency and
use of these methods is not limited";87 (2) adding a paragraph to Rule
26(b) directing the court to limit disproportionate discovery; 88 and (3)
adding Rule 26(g) requiring the signing of discovery requests as a
certification of their bona fides and permitting sanctions for viola-
tion. 89 The Advisory Committee Notes explained that the changes con-
templated "greater judicial involvement in the discovery process," 99 and
that the sanctions provision paralleled the contemporaneous amend-
ment to Rule 11. 9 ' The ABA Special Committee generally favored these
amendments but proposed clarifications. 92 Others had varying views."
Regain, Paul Carrington, C. Ronald Ellington, William Eldridge, John Frank, Seth Hufittedler,
Frank Kaufman, A. Leo Levin, Weyman Lundquist, Thomas Martin, Alan Morrison, Daniel
Meador, Edward Mullinix, Maurice Rosenberg, Alvin Rubin, Mary Schroeder and John
Schenefield). Among other things, the minutes say that the group supported court managerial
treatment from the beginning for discovery-heavy cases, but divided on how to identify such cases,
See Minutes of Conference on Improving Pretrial Discovery 2 (Aug. 28, 1980) (on file with
author). It also endorsed efforts to end disproportionate discovery. See id. at 3.
85 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 90 F.R.D.
451 (1981) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules].
89 For a discussion of these amendments, see Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and
Delay: The Potential Impact of the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 Juonwroux
363 (1983).
87 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules, supra note 85, at 478.
88 See id, at 479.
89 See id. at 479-80.
90 Id. at 482.
91 See id. at .482-83.
92 See Digests of Comments Received (attached to Letter from Hon. Walter Mansfield, Chair,
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Joseph Spaniol, Deputy Director, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (Dec. 11, 1981) (on file with author)).
95 Compare Letter front Professor Charles Alan Wright, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, to John P. Frank and Hon. Mary M. Schroeder 1 (Oct. 8, 1981) (on file with author)
(characterizing the package of proposed amendments as "devoid of substance" and "almost a
parody of the great work done by the Civil Rules Committee in earlier days"), and Memorandum
from Committee on Federal Rules, American College of Trial Lawyers, to Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 14-18 (Nov. 17, 1981) (on file
with author) (questioning use of "values at stake" as a criterion for limiting discovery), with
Statement of Hon. Mary M. Schroeder and John P. Frank to the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States 12-13 (Nov. 6, 1981) (on file with author)
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At the completion of the commentary period, the Advisory Committee
fortified Rule 26(g) by changing the authorization for sanctions from
"may" to "shall" and the amendments went into effect in 1983." The
ABA Special Conunittee, believing its work to be finished, disbanded
after five years of activity. As one of its members put it in 1982 during
the National Conference on Discovery Reform, the 1983 package of
amendments "takes one of the themes of the Special Committee's work
[judicial hands-on management] and carries it much further than we
had contemplated. "95
III. THE SECOND ROUND OF DISCOVERY CONTAINMENT—THE 1993
AMENDMENTS
If the first round was characterized by a possible failure of resolve
by the Advisory Committee in 1979 regarding scope of discovery, 96
 the
second round might be characterized as involving too much resolve by
the Committee, at least on certain points. In considering this resolve,
however, it is important to understand (at the outset) that the chief
features of the 1991-93 package of proposals had antecedents. Indeed,
several had emerged during the first round of discovery containment
but had not been adopted. Presumptive numerical limitations on dis-
covery events, as the ABA Special Committee proposed for interroga-
tories in 1977, were much in evidence in the Advisory Committee's
1991 draft of proposed amendments. A memorandum sent to the
Advisory Committee by Assistant Attorney General Meador in January
1978 suggested deferring discovery until after a conference with the
court.97
 Broadened discovery regarding experts who would testify at
trial appeared to have become the reality in many places, although the
rules did not so provide. 98 The Manual for Complex Litigation already
(supporting changes to Rules 26(a) and (b) but not addition of Rule 26(g) and attaching similar
views of Hon. Alvin Rubin and Professor Edward Cooper).
94 See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 213-20 (1983).
"Frank F. Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Reform, S REV. Lrric. 1, 43 (1982)
(quoting Steven Urran). Praise, however, has not been universal. Writing in 1989, the Brookings
Task Force on Civil justice Reform asserted that it "believes that time has proven Justice Powell's
1980 prediction to be entirely correct. Although well-intentioned, past changes in the rules failed
to alleviate the dual problems of litigation costs and delays." THE BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR
ALL REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN CIVIL LITIGATION 9 (1989).
96 See the later comments of Judge Mansfield, quoied in text accompanying note 125 infra.
97 See Comments on Proposed Discovery Rules Changes Promulgated by the ABA's Section
of Litigation in December 1977 1 (Jan. 6, 1978) (enclosed with Letter front Daniell Meador,
Assistant United States Attorney General, to Hon. Elbert Parr Tuttle (Jan. 6, 1978) (on file with
author)).
98 Ste William W Schwarzer, Guidelines for Discovery, Motion Practice and Trial, 117 F.R.D.
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recommended expert reports.g9 Strengthening the supplementation
provisions was also proposed in early 1978. 100 Initial disclosure, the
lightning-rod for so much else, had been proposed by a state court
judge in the ABA Journal in March 1983.'°' Even in the 1960s the
Columbia Survey found that voluntary disclosure was widespread. 102
Indeed, as Professor Subrin's article in this symposium shows, the
original draft of discovery provisions for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure contained provisions for disclosure of core infortnation.'"
In 1991, the Advisory Committee brought out an array of pro-
posed amendments: (1) requiring initial disclosure of the identity of
any witness or document with information that bears significantly on
any claim or defense"; (2) precluding formal discovery until after this
initial disclosure; (3) directing exclusion of any evidence not disclosed
as required; (4) requiring preparation of a report detailing the testi-
mony and background of any expert trial witness; (5) expanding the
duty to supplement discovery responses and applying this expanded
duty to disclosures as well; (6) placing presumptive numerical limits
on both interrogatories and depositions; (7) limiting depositions to six
hours; (8) authorizing videotaping of depositions without advance
court approval; and (9) requiring that parties who withhold material
on grounds of privilege supply details about the withheld materials
sufficient to permit evaluation of the claim of privilege." A number
of further changes were also proposed.m
273, 276 (1987) ("experts who arc prospective witnesses are normally produced for deposition
by the opposing party as a matter of course'').
99 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CFR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 21.481 (1986).
1 ° See Comments on Proposed Discovery Rules Changes Promulgated by the ABA's Section
of Litigation in December 1977, supra note 97, at 2 (pointing to absence of sanctions for failure
to supplement and suggesting that "the Committee might want to consider providing for appro-
priate sanctions for such failure").
1 ° 1 See Gerald G. Glaser, A New Law of "Supply and Demand" in Discovery, 69 A.B.A. J. 320,
320-21 (1983). For a review of the development of the initial disclosure proposal, see Richard L.
Marcus, Of Babies and Balhwaler: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761,
805-12 (1993).
102 Forty-five percent of attorneys who used formal discovery, and 40% of attorneys who did
not, reported that their adversaries "voluntarily made disclosures of the sort normally made
during discovery." GLASER, supra note 8, at 100-01. Glaser noted that the disclosures seemed to
be more complete and candid in the absence of formal discovery. See id. at 101.
102 See Sarin, supra note 4, at 718-19.
104 See Committee on Rules or Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-135 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Preliminary Draft].
105 A full catalogue of the changes seems unwarranted, for many were conforming or tech-
nical. A sampler is in order: (I) addition of Rule 26(a) (3), requiring disclosure of details about
witnesses and exhibits a party would use at the trial; (2) authorization in Rule 26(b) (2) for local
rules changing the limitations on number of discovery events provided in the national rules for
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The acrimonious general reception of some of these proposals is
well known and not worth rehearsing here. 106 But it is worth pausing
to reflect a moment on what the initial disclosure proposal seemed to
be on its face. To begin with, the limit on initial disclosure to material
that "bears significantly on any claim or defense" sounds like an effort
to narrow the scope of this obligation compared to the general scope
of discovery. Thus, it does not involve the much-reviled "subject mat-
ter" terminology of Rule 26(b) (1), and might have been taken as a
step toward narrowing the scope of discovery to claims and defenses.
Requiring that the material "bear significantly" on claims and defenses
seems designed to narrow the obligation further and to avoid incursion
into peripheral matters. Certainly the direction is consistent with the
claimed limitation of disclosure to "core information."
Additionally, the amendments seemed designed to give teeth to
the proportionality provisions added in 1983. Thus, a court asked to
permit a party to exceed the numerical or time limitations prescribed
should determine whether that would be "consistent with the princi-
ples stated in Rule 26(b) (2) ."'°7
Given the "flood of objections unprecedented in fifty plus years
of rule-making,"108 the Advisory Committee reconsidered the disclo-
sure requirement. First it decided to withdraw the proposal altogether,
much as it had done with narrowing the scope of discovery in 1979. 109
But a number of districts had adopted disclosure provisions modeled
on the draft amendments pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act, and
we are told that there seemed some need to "put the sidewalks where
the people were walking. " 110 On reconsideration, the Advisory Commit-
categories of case; (3) changing Rule 26(b) (2) (iii) to direct the court to limit proposed discovery
when its "burden of expense" outweighs its "likely benefit"; (4) changing Rule 26(b) (3)(A) to
authorize depositions of right of all experts who will testify at trial; (5) requiring a party moving
to compel discovery or for a protective order to certify having tried to meet and confer with the
opposing party to resolve the discovery dispute; (6) amending Rule 30(a) (2) to preclude a second
deposition of any person who has already been deposed in the case; (7) providing in Rule 30(e)
that the deponent has a right to review the transcript of the deposition only if he or she so requests
before completion of the deposition; (8) changing Rule 33(b) to direct a responding party who
objects to an interrogatory to state the objection with specificity and answer to the extent the
interrogatory is not objectionable. See id.
1th9 For a review, see Charles W. Sorensen, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)—"Much Ado About Nothing?", 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 729-92 (1995).
I"See, e.g., Proposed Rule 30(a) (2), 1991 Preliminary Draft, supra note 104, at 107.
INAnn Pelham, Judges Make Quite a Discovery: Litigators Erupt, Kill Plan To Reform Federal
Civil Rules, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1982, at 1,
1 " See Minutes of the February 21, 1992 Meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Civil
Rules 3-4 (May 11, 1992) (on file with author).
11°This was the explanation offered by Paul Carrington, Reporter of the Advisory Committee
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tee adopted a revised approach to disclosure. It permitted any district
to opt out, and permitted the parties to stipulate not to disclose.
Additionally, although disclosure would apply to the full scope of
discovery, it would only apply as to disputed facts alleged with particu-
larity, thereby reducing the burden resulting from vague complaints.
In addition, there should be a conference between counsel early in the
case to develop a discovery plan before the Rule 16 conference with
the court. The Committee also deleted the six-hour limitation on
depositions,'" but it added further limitations on conduct during
them, forbidding instructions that a witness refuse to answer unless
based on a privilege or a limitation on discovery imposed by the judge
in the case.
With a less ambitious disclosure plank, the amendments were
cautiously adopted by the Supreme Court." 2 The disclosure provision
at the time of these actions. See Memorandums from Rick Marcus, Special Reporter, to Discovery
Subcommittee, Civil Rules Committee 19 (Feb. 6, 1997) (quoting Carrington) (on file with
author).
Because this proposal may surface again, it is worthwhile to review the ambivalence of the
Advisory Committee in 1991-92. Before the proposal was ultimately scotched, Committee mem-
bers repeatedly voiced misgivings about it. Among the concerns were the possible need for a
timekeeper to measure the number of hours and time spent on colloquy (Minutes of the
November 29—December I, 1990 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (Nov.
29—Dec, 1, 1990) (on file with author); Minutes of the February 21-23, 1991 Meeting of the
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules 5 (Apr. 5, 1991) (on file with author)); problems of
dividing the time between counsel and generating excessive motion practice (Minutes of the May
22-24, 1991 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules 4 (June 26, 1991) (on he
with author)). Finally, at the meeting on February 21, 1992, the following transpired:
judge Winter argued against the limitation on the length of depositions as an
inducement to strategic behavior, Judge Keeton argued for the limit as long as it is
subject to extension by agreement of the parties. Judge Pointer noted that it works
in ND Georgia. The Reporter noted that the purpose of the rule was to give some
bargaining power to the party seeking to constrain overlong depositions. Judge
Phillips noted the concern that an evasive expert may succeed in stonewalling for
six hours. The Reporter noted that one purpose of the proposal was to protect the
deponent. judge Brazil thought that the limit will not be easily negotiated in cases
in which there is a serious imbalance of information. judge Winter reiterated that
it will produce a lot of traffic in the judges' chambers, The Committee voted 5-2
to eliminate the limit on length of depositions. it was agreed that local rules should
be authorized.
Minutes of the February 21, 1992 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules 4-5 (May
11, 1992) (on file with author).
112 Thc ChiefJusticc's letter of transmittal to Congress said that "fiv]hile the Court is satisfied
that the required procedures have been observed, this transmittal does not necessarily indicate
that the Court itself would have proposed these amendments in the form submitted." Letter from
Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Hon. Thomas
Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 22, 1993) reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 403
(1993).
justice Scalia, joined by justices Thomas and Soutcr, dissented, In his opinion, Justice Scalia
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almost did not go into effect. The ABA opposed it," 3 the Clinton
Administration opposed it," 4
 the House of Representatives passed a
bill deleting it from the package of amendments, 1 E 3 and the bill failed
to pass the Senate only because of a last-minute concern about other
aspects of the package. Virtually nobody believes that disclosure would
have survived an actual vote." 6
IV. TENTATIVE LESSONS FROM THE DISCOVERY CONTAINMENT
EXPERIENCE
Besides learning what has been tried before, this review of twenty
years of discovery containment provides food for some tentative lessons
to be kept in mind as we enter what may be a third round of attempts
to contain discovery. At least the following areas seem pertinent.
A. Leadership and Controversy
Nowadays one often hears calls for leadership. To what extent
should the Advisory Committee be a leader? The question seems im-
excoriated this decision on the ground it would add another costly layer to litigation, and that
disclosure "does not fit comfortably within the American judicial system ... (biy placing upon
lawyers the obligation to disclose information damaging to their clients." 146 F.R.D. at 510-11.
113 At its August 1993 convention, the ABA House of Delegates approved by a voice vote a
recommendation of the ABA Young Lawyers Division as follows:
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges Congress to reject
amendments to Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure approved by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
requiring disclosure of discovery materials without specific written requests.
ABA, Young Lawyers Division Report to the House of Delegates 38 (Aug. 1995).
114 See Randall Samborn et al., Administration Opposes New Disclosure Rule, NAT'L L J., July
26, 1993, at 5 (describing letter from Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell to House
Judiciary Committee opposing Rule 26(a) (1)).
115 See H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This bill would also have deleted the provision
permitting unilateral videotaping of depositions.
116 As described by Paul Carrington, Reporter of the Committee during consideration of the
disclosure provisions, the brouhaha was as follows:
The United States House of Representatives voted unanimously to derail the Com-
mittee's proposal and substitute one of its own. The House bill was brought before
the Senate Judiciary Committee on the day before adjournment when that commit-
tee was acting under a rule requiring unanimity. When Senator Metzenbaum
objected to the House bill, that killed it. And so Rule 26 became law as the result
of its support by a single Senator voting against a unanimous House, a House that
would have been joined by an almost unanimous Serrate if the matter had even
reached the Senate floor. The final vote was thus one Senator against the world,
with the one Senator prevailing. It would therefore be preposterous to argue that
Congress in any degree approved Rule 26.
Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovich, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The
Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Rule 23, 39 Am. L. REV. 462, 485 (1997).
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portant only with regard to proposals that are controversial; it is easy
to lead in an uncontroversial direction. At least the Advisory Commit-
tee needs to be cautious about being a follower; one criticism levelled
at the 1978 proposals was that they were largely developed by another
group—the ABA Special Committee.' 17 Yet, in the words of the Federal
Courts Committee of the State Bar of California, "[new proposals have
engendered so much controversy as the proposed limitations on the
scope of discovery." 18 In 1992, at least one member of the Advisory
Committee urged promulgation of Rule 26(a) (1) at the critical meet-
ing on the ground the Committee should provide leadership.' 19 As we
all know, that proposal led to far more controversy and was nearly
aborted by Congress.
Although controversy does not necessarily mean that a proposed
rule change should be resolved by Congress,'" it provides at least one
considerable reason for caution in the discovery area. Discovery re-
forms that excite widespread opposition in the profession face an
uphill battle to have any positive effect. As Professor Wright put it thirty
years ago, "it would be a mistake to impose on the profession a proce-
dure to which it has strong opposition, for the rule will work only as
those who must employ it want it to work." 12 ' Yet that lesson can be
overlearned. Rule 26(a) (1) is not the only rule to have survived con-
gressional review by the skin of its teeth.' 22 That sort of tumultuous past
does not mean necessarily a rule will fail,' 23 and the considerable
support for disclosure among lawyers surveyed by the Federal Judicial
Center and the Rand Corporation'" suggests that Rule 26(a) (1) could
117 See Letter from Charles Alan Wright to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
supra note 58, at 3 (expressing "grave reservations about the process by which the proposed
amendments came into being").
118 Memoranclum from Federal Courts Committee, State Bar of California, to the Board of
Governors of the California State Bar, supra note 69, at 8.
119 See Minutes of the April 13-15, 1992 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules 7 (May 11, 1992) (on file with author) ("judge Phillips urged that the Committee had a
duty to provide leadership in light of its study and hearings.").
12(' "In the absence of consensus, the Advisory Committee is apt to equate controversy with
politics, which is for Congress." Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A
Call for a Moratorium, 59 Bkoox. L. REy, 841, 843 (1993).
121 Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform; Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. R.Ev. 563,
575 (1967).
122 When Rule 71A was adopted, both houses of Congress passed resolutions designed to
prevent it from going into effect, but because these resolutions differed in detail the rule went
into effect anyway. See 12 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 3041, at 189 11.13 (2d
ed. 1997).
123 Rule 71A, despite its brush with death, has operated smoothly since its adoption four
decades ago. See id. §§ 3042-56.
124 In its survey of lawyers in 1000 cases closed in late 1996, the Federal judicial Center found
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prove effective despite the level of expressed opposition to it when it
was adopted. One of the Advisory Committee's most difficult tasks is
to weigh the commentary it receives, a point that Judge Mansfield
made to his successor:
Based on my rule-making experience, I think it is important
not to give too much weight to the fact that those opposing
a proposed change . . . often far outnumber responding sup-
porters. History shows that supporters rarely voice their views,
whereas opponents often do. In 1979, for instance, early in
my chairmanship, the Advisory Committee, responding to
vigorous opposition to its proposed changes in the discovery
rules, watered down the proposals . . . only to be met with a
blistering dissent by three Justices . . . on the ground that the
changes were not strong enough. As a result, in 1983 we made
much more drastic changes in Rules 7, 11, 16 and 26, which
were adopted without incident and are now in effect. 125
B. Uniformity
The passage of the Rules Enabling Act, which authorized a single
system of federal procedure to supplant varying state systems applied
in federal court pursuant to the Conformity Act, represented an act of
leadership that can be traced back to Pound.' 26 The adoption of the
that responding lawyers who believed that disclosure had an effect in their cases generally
concluded that this effect was in the desired direction. For example, 32% felt that disclosure
decreased the duration of the case, while only 7% believed that it increased delay, and 39% found
a decrease in client litigation expenses, as opposed to 16% who found the reverse effect. See
Thomas E. Willging et al,, Federal Judicial CM., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure
Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV, 525, 563 tbl. 17 (1998) [here-
inafter FJC Study]. Similarly, 36% of responding lawyers believed that disclosure increased the
prospects of settlement, while only 6% thought it reduced them, and 25% believed that it
improved the fairness of the outcome, while only 5% saw a negative effect. See id. Overall, 41%
of respondents favored a national rule requiring disclosure in every district. See id. at 588 thl. 38.
The RAND survey of lawyers in cases in 1991 and 1993 (before the effective date of Rule
26(a) (1)) found a similar level of support among lawyers. Thus, approximately 60% of respond.
ing lawyers favored requiring early disclosure without a formal discovery request in cases of the
type that was involved in this study. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL
CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 274 (1997).
125
 Letter from Hon. Walter Mansfield, Second Circuit, United States Court of Appeals, to
Hon. Frank M. Johnson, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 1 (May 9, 1985) (on file with
author); see also Wright, supra note 121, at 575 ("This does not amount to a referendum.
Comments on tentative drafts that come front lawyers, judges, or har groups are considered on
the basis of their inherent persuasiveness. No attempt is made to count noses.").
126 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015,
1045-48 (1982). The Rules' effect in creating uniformity can be overstated, however. Shortly after
they came into effect, the Judicial Conference appointed a committee to examine existing local
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a model by many states testifies to
that leadership.' 27 Although there are other areas in which disunifor-
mity has emerged,'" discovery has become the heartland of local in-
novation and deviation since 1970.
The Advisory Committee has in large measure indulged this local
innovation. For one thing, proposing authority for local rulemaking
seems to be a common response to controversy. In 1978, for example,
the Committee initially responded to the idea of limiting the number
of interrogatories by proposing authority for district courts to do so by
a majority vote of the judges therein.' 23 As Assistant Attorney General
Maurice Rosenberg protested in a letter to the Chair of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, this "would encourage
a Balkanization of discovery practice."'"
Although the 1978 proposal to authorize local regulation of the
number of interrogatories was withdrawn, Balkanization has become
the order of the day in a variety of respects.' 3 ' In recent years this
tendency has been fortified to some extent by the Civil Justice Reform
Act ("CJRA"), 132 but the argument that the CJRA authorized overriding
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is dubious at best.'" Instead, local
deviation has de facto become the Advisory Committee's experimental
laboratory, albeit one without central direction. For example, given the
Advisory Committee's refusal to impose numerical limitations on in-
terrogatories, any local rule doing so violated Rule 83,' 9h but the Advi-
sory Committee's response never hinted at that. To the contrary, when
rules, and it found much divergence, See Report on Local District Court Rules, 4 FED. R. SERV. 969
(1940). See generally 12 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 3152, at 496.
127 See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court System,s of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986),
125
	
example, even though the judicial Conference concluded in 1971 that reducing civil
juries below 12 members should be left to Congress, within a few years many districts had done
so by local rule, and the Supreme Court upheld such a rule. See 12 FEDERAL Panc-ricE &
PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 3153, at 520-22. Somewhat similarly, even before Congress authorized
consensual reference to it magistrate for trial by adopting 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) in 1979, over half
of the districts allowed such reference by local rule. See id. § 3071, at 391.
I2g See Committee oil Rules of Practice and Procedure of the judicial Conference of the U.S.,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 77 F.R.D.
613, 646 (1978).
13° Letter from Maurice Rosenberg, Assistant United States Attorney General, to Hon. Roszel
Thomsen, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (May 4, 1978) (on
file with author).
121 See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the BaUtanization of Federal Civil Procedure,
24 ARIZ. ST. U. 1393 (1993).
1 " 28 U.S.C. §§ 471 et seq. (1994 & Stipp. 1995).
199
	
Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L,
REV. 1447 (1994).
124 See 8A FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 2168.1, at 258-59.
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the Committee ultimately did adopt a national rule limiting the num-
ber of interrogatories in 1993, it not only invoked initial disclosure as
a justification for reduced need for interrogatory practice, but also
explained that "telxperience in over half of the district courts has
confirmed that limitations on the number of interrogatories are useful
and manageable."' 33 Similarly, a number of districts required parties to
meet and confer before filing Rule 37(a) motions to compel. At least
one court of appeals held that such a local rule was invalid because
establishing such a prerequisite to a motion authorized by the national
rules was inconsistent with them,' 38 but shortly thereafter Rule 37 was
amended to introduce such a requirement. The Committee justified
the change on the ground that "Whis requirement is based on suc-
cessful experience with similar local rules of court promulgated pur-
suant to Rule 83.'""
Much as we are informed that the Committee authorized opting
out in 1993 with "great remorse," 138 this history makes uniformity at
best a tattered banner for discovery reform. Obviously, experience with
innovative rule provisions is a sensible source of information about
whether to apply them more broadly. But one who samples that fruit
will later have a hard time condemning it on the ground that no
authority has been given for other innovations that contravene the
national scheme.
C. Success and Failure
Foremost among the lessons to take from the previous rounds of
discovery containment should be whether it has worked. Complete
success would mean, of course, that we would have no occasion to
consider a third round of containment efforts. Assuming that complete
success cannot be claimed, the question remains whether the effective-
ness of the changes actually adopted provides reason to hope that
further changes might achieve complete success.
It seems somewhat early to try to pass judgment on the 1993
amendments, but one who focuses instead on the 1980 and 1983
packages finds reason for considerable humility. Most prominent is the
Rule 26(f) discovery conference, added in 1980 at the emphatic urging
"5 FED. R, Civ. P. 33 advisory committee's notes, 146 F.R.D. 401, 675 (1993).
156 See Wilson v. City of Zanesville, 954 F.2d 349, 352-53 (6th Cir. 1992) (Rule 37 does not
require a conference as a prerequisite for a motion to compel, so a local rule cannot either).
137 FED. R. Ctv. P. 37 advisory committee's notes, 146 F.R.D. at 690.
158 See Memorandum from Rick Marcus to Discovery Subcommittee, supra note 110, at 19
(quoting Paul Carrington).
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of the ABA Special Committee. As early as 1981, John Frank and Judge
Schroeder told the Committee that in the Ninth Circuit judges were
"making almost no use" of the new provision.' 39 It may be that there-
after the 1983 amendments, with their emphasis on case management
embodied in the scheduling and other requirements of Rule 16, di-
verted energies that would otherwise have flowed into use of the
discovery conference. It seems undeniable that this early report con-
tinued to be accurate, and in 1991 the Committee itself gave up and
proposed deleting the conference because it "has not proved to be an
effective device to prevent discovery abuses." 140 Thereafter, a new Rule
26(f) was created to implement the 1993 requirement that counsel
meet and confer about a discovery plan that is to be submitted to the
judge before the initial Rule 16 conference, but this was quite a differ-
ent creature.
Although not condemned to the ignominious fate of the discovery
conference, other features of the first round of containment can be
viewed as modest successes at best. The Reporter touted the propor-
tionality provisions to Rule 26(b) and the deletion of the former
invitation to unlimited frequency of discovery absent a protective order
as a "180 degree shift" in orientation.' 1 ' Magistrate Wayne Brazil em-
phasized the new orientation in a 1985 opinion, pointing out that the
1983 amendments "superimposted] the concept of proportionality
on all behavior in the discovery arena." 142 These descriptions of the
changes in Rule 26 are accurate, and it further seems that the new
orientation of the rule is precisely correct in seeking to calibrate the
amount of discovery to the needs of the case.
But there is little evidence that a significant shift has actually
occurred as a result of the amendment to the rule. For one thing, it
could be said that the concept of proportionality was already intrinsic
to Rule 26 before 1983, as some argued when the amendment was
proposed.'" In any event, "the amendment itself seems to have created
1 " Statement of Hon. Mary Schroeder and John P. Frank to the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 93, at 9.
14U
	
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 105 (1991).
141 ARTIDIR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS To TIIE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 32-33
(1984).
142 In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., Inc., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
143 See, e.g., Letter from Charles Alan Wright to John P. Frank and Hon. Mary M. Schroeder,
supra note 93, at 3 ("I think the changes in [Rule 26] (a) and (b) (1) make no change whatever
in the present rule or in what courts are in fact doing.").
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only a ripple in the caselaw, although some courts now acknowledge
that it is clearer than it was before that they should take responsibility
for the amount of discovery in cases they manage."'" Determining
what is too much in a given case is often quite difficult for a judge ,145
and a rule change does not make it easier. As judicial management
evolves, and if the discovery plan endorsed by new Rule 26(f) endures,
it may become more manageable, and some accelerated implementa-
don may be expected. For the present, however, it is not possible to
say that this seemingly fundamental shift in the rules has had a major
impact.
A somewhat similar fate befell another 1983 addition—the cer-
tification requirement of Rule 26(g). This provision seemingly was
expected to be a tool for implementing the proportionality idea, by
forcing lawyers to think about proportionality before undertaking dis-
covery. It paralleled the 1983 amendment to Rule 11, 146
 and it was
thought that it would be used equally often, Although it is true that
there are a considerable number of cases involving Rule 26(g),I 47 this
forecast has clearly proven wrong, as the Advisory Committee recog-
nized when it issued its call for comments on Rule 11 in 1990.' 48
 Given
144 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 5, § 2008.1, at 121.
145 As Judge Higginbotham put it at the dine the 1981 proposals were pending: "It's very
difficult for the judge to ask, 'Well, you're spending too much time with John Jones, Sales
Vice-President of the company. Why are you spending so much time with a salesman?' .. He
can't know that much about your case." Patrick E. Higginbotham, Discovery Management Consid-
erations in Antitrust Cases, 51 ANTITRUST U. 231, 236 (1982).
At about the same time, Judge Schwarzcr sounded a similar warning: "How is the judge to
say with assurance that in this particular instance a lawyer is engaged in a fishing expedition? .. •
Who can say with assurance that a far-fetched line of discovery may not promise pay dirt for a
litigant?" Edward F. Sherman, TheJudge's Role in Discovery, 3 REV. LITIC. 89, 104 (1982) (quoting
Hon. William W Schwarzer).
146 As one court put it regarding Rule 26(g):
Like FRCP 11, its requirements arc strict; the standard of care is objective; and the
sanctions are mandatory. Due to the similarity, courts have applied the case law
applicable to the 1983 version of FRCP 11 to the sanctions language in FRCP 26(g).
In fact, sanctions inappropriately imposed under FRCP 11 or 37 have been con-
verted to FRCP 26(g) sanctions.
Lee v. Walters, 172 F.R.D. 421, 432-33 (D. Or. 1997) (citation omitted).
147 See, e.g., Oregon RSA No. 6, Inc. v. Castle Rock Cellular of Oregon LP, 76 F.3d 1003, 1008
(9th Cir. 1996) (defendant's objection that document was confidential while failing to disclose
that it had been made public warranted sanctions); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d
262, 268 (10th Cir. 1995) (sanctions imposed on attorney for untimely filing of subpoena duces
teem); Banco de Ponce v. Buxbaum, No. 95-7469, 1995 WL 762983, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 1995)
(sanctions for false responses to interrogatories should be based on Rule 26(g)); Zimmerman v.
Bishop Estate, 25 F.3d 784, 789-90 (9th Cir. 1994) (sanctions imposed on plaintiff for interroga-
tories and document requests that were intended to harass); Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container
Int'l B.V., 865 F.2d 676, 687 (5th Cir. 1989) (plaintiffs' years of discovery without any additional
evidence show that plaintiffs are seeking to inundate defendant with discovery).
145
 The Committee commented then, somewhat ruefully:
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the firestorm that surrounded the 1983 amendment to Rule 11, having
less effect than that change may not be undesirable. But the modest
overall effect of the 1983 discovery amendments justifies, in turn,
considerable modesty about the prospective effects of further rule
changes.
D. The Payoff for Persistence
There is no res judicata in rulemaking. Although adopted provi-
sions may not accomplish as much as their proponents hope, rejected
ones do often find favor on another day. This may be more true of
discovery than other areas, since the topic has been near the center of
the Committee's agenda for more than two decades and there are only
so many different ideas available for dealing with discovery problems.
Numerical limitations on interrogatories, rejected by the Committee
in 1978 but embraced in many districts, were finally adopted nation-
wide, along with numerical limitations on depositions, in 1993. Elec-
tronic recording of right for depositions, first proposed in 1967 149 and
proposed again in 1978, was finally adopted in 1993, albeit by the skin
of its teeth.' 5°
For the future, the persistence champion is the idea of narrowing
the described scope of discovery. Initially proposed by the ABA Special
Committee in 1977 and circulated as a possible amendment in 1978,
it was withdrawn as a Committee proposal in 1979. 15 ' In 1989, the New
York State Bar renewed .the suggestion,'" but the Committee was not
An observation has been made, however, that the 1983 sanctions provisions have
been used primarily in connection with alleged pleading abuses, although the ABA
and the 1983 Committee were at least as concerned with discovery abuses. Perhaps
the discovery abuse problem was overstated, or perhaps it has been remedied by
the prophylactic effect of Rule 26(g), or perhaps the potential of that rule has not
yet been realized by the bar. If the latter is the case, the Committee would welcome
suggestions to enhance the eillectiveness of Rule 26(g).
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the judicial Conference of the U.S., Call for
Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules, 131
F.R.D. 335, 345 (1990).
149 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts Relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43 F.R.D. 211, 239-40 (1967).
15°The bill passed by the House of Representatives to delete mandatory initial disclosure
from the 1993 amendments also would have deleted videotaping of right from the amendment
package. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 46-70.
152 See Committee on Discovery, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Section on Commercial and Fed. Ling.,
Report on Discovery Under Rule 26(b)( I), 127 F.R.D. 625, 634-38 (1989).
776	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 39:747
then receptive)" In 1995, the American College of Trial Lawyers ad-
vanced the proposal again.'"
E. The Shifting Sands of Litigation and Discovery Problems
Although some proposed reforms persist as ideas, the nature of
problem areas does not stay the same. Indeed, looking back twenty
years provides a significant contrast to the areas of current ferment.
The most striking contrast is to the type of case that provoked
concern then and now. In the 1970s, the avatar of problem litigation
and the locus for discovery dissatisfaction was the private antitrust suit.
At the 1976 Pound Conference, antitrust cases were often invoked as
the source of contemporary evils. The concern with this sort of litiga-
tion was pervasive enough to prompt President Carter to appoint a
National Commission to review antitrust law and propose solutions,
including narrowing of the scope of discovery) 55 There was no mention
of product liability cases as posing even a remotely similar concern. In
the 1990s, by way of contrast, the antitrust case is a nonstarter and
products liability cases occupy center stage.
Of course, these changes can be easily traced to other develop-
ments; after the installation of the Reagan Administration, the level of
governmental antitrust enforcement declined considerably. Around
the same time, asbestos and other mass tort litigation virtually burst
155 AS described in the Minutes of the November 17-18, 1989, Meeting of the Advisory
Committee, at 9:
The Committee next considered the proposal of the New York State Bar. Magis-
trate Brazil reported that there has been a comparable debate in California on the
scope of discovery, and that the Civil Rules Committee resisted heavy lobbying on
the same proposal in the 1970s. There was then strong opposition from the plain-
tiffs' and civil rights' bar. On the other hand, it is not clear that there is a real
difference between "claims and defenses" and "subject matter." The Reporter noted
that the "claims and defenses" approach implies fact pleading. Magistrate Brazil
pointed out that the original discovery rules drafted by Sunderland assumed that
discovery would be self-executing. judge Winter was of the view that the change
would not be consequential, except perhaps to change the pleading practices.
Magistrate Brazil acknowledged that after the 1983 rules, especially Rule 26(g), the
question of relevance is no longer more than a threshold question, and no real
change could be effected. There was no support for the proposal to adopt the
"claims and defenses" language.
Advisory Comm. on the Civil Rules, Civil Rules Committee Minutes 9 (Nov. 17-18, 1989) (on file
with author).
154 See Letter from Kenneth J. Sherk, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Committee of the
American College of Trial Lawyers, to Hon. Patrick Higginbotham, Chair, Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules 1-2 (Oct. 11, 1995) (on file with author).
155 See Report of the National Commission for the Review of the Antitrust Laws and Proce-
dures, 80 F.R.D. 509 (1979).
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onto the stage. But the shift reminds us to beware of the assumption
that today's problems will also be tomorrow's problems. Some prob-
lems, indeed, do seem to go away. Interrogatories, for example, were
characterized in the 1970s as the discovery tool that caused the greatest
difficulty, but today they arouse little or no concern (perhaps because
districts began limiting their number even though that exceeded the
proper scope of local rules).
F. The Problem of Problem Cases
A recurrent theme throughout the past twenty years is that in most
cases discovery works smoothly, but there is some number of problem
cases which are the true source of almost all genuine discovery difficul-
ties. At the same time, it seems widely agreed that one of the biggest
problems with problem cases is deciding which cases are problem
cases.
This definitional dilemma should not come as a surprise. Con-
fronting a related issue, the drafters of the Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion have vacillated over trying to define complex litigation. The first
edition, published in 1969, described categories of "potentially com-
plex cases," focusing either on the type of claim made (e.g., antitrust,
patent or mass disaster) or the procedural characteristics of the case
(e.g., multi-party cases, class actions or derivative actions).'" The sec-
ond edition, which appeared in 1985, declined even to try to define
the term. Finding complete silence inadequate,' 57 the third edition,
published in 1995, adopts an arguably circular "functional definition"
geared to the "need for [judicial] management." 15"
155 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 0.22 (1969).
157 The Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) states:
The Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, dropped this elusive definition [con-
tained in the first edition] but made no effort to arrive at a substitute. Yet a
definition is important to understanding the objective of this manual, for there is
always a risk that complexity may be introduced simply by calling litigation "com-
plex."
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (mato § 10.1 (1995).
158 Id. It elaborates:
A functional definition of complex litigation recognizes that the need for man-
agement in the sense used here—judicial management with the participation of
counsel—dues not simply arise from complexity, but is its defining characteristic:
The greater the need for management, the more "complex" is the litigation. Clearly,
litigation involving many parties in numerous related cases—especially if pending
in different jurisdictions—requires management and is complex, as is litigation
involving large numbers of witnesses and documents and extensive discovery. On
the other hand, litigation raising difficult and novel questions of law, though
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The task of identifying problem discovery cases is similar. Thus,
in its Second Report the ABA's Special Committee concluded that it
was "not feasible" to identify such cases,' 69
 and the illustrious ad hoc
committee convened by the Department of Justice that same year 16°
strongly supported managerial treatment for "discovery-heavy cases"
and believed these cases could be identified in advance, but "divided
acutely" on how to do so. 16 ' Accordingly, although the goal of segregat-
ing the relatively few problem cases for treatment not visited on other
cases continues to be attractive, it may prove a chimera. Absent a way
to distinguish, the Advisory Committee is left to decide whether meas-
ures designed to cure the ills of the problem cases will cause problems
in the others.
G. The Problem of an Empirical Base
Another issue that emerges from the first two rounds of discovery
containment is the growing importance of empirical input. An empiri-
cal element is intrinsic to much rulemaking, but often it is difficult to
develop an adequate empirical base—a topic that has received in-
creased academic attention in recent years.' 62 As a general matter, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been drafted without the benefit
of detailed empirical input.
The 1970 amendments were an exception, in that they had rela-
tively firm empirical foundations in the Columbia Survey, which the
Advisory Committee cited to explain some of what it did and did not
challenging to the court, may require little or no management, and therefore may
not be complex as that term is used here.
Id.
mm The Special Committee explained:
During our deliberations, we considered suggestions that the case prone to discov-
ery abuse be identified by reference to the amount in controversy, the nature of
the dispute, or some other readily identifiable characteristic. We have concluded
that it is not feasible to do so. While we are aware of suggestions that modified
discovery procedures be made available in a given class of cases and although we
are monitoring experiments taking that approach, we are convinced that many of
the problems and abuses cut across easily identifiable categories of cases.
Special Comm. for the Discovery of Discovery Abuse, ABA Section of Litig., Second Report of
the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137, 138 (1980).
Ifie See supra note 84 for a list of the members.
161 See Minutes of Conference on Improving Pretrial Discovery 2 (Aug. 28, 1980) (attached
to Letter from Maurice Rosenberg, Assistant United States Attorney General, to Hon. Walter
Mansfield, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Sept. 11, 1980) (on file with author)).
162 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Ctn. L. Rev. 366 (1986) (also endorsing
social science testing of new procedures to verify their effectiveness); Laurens Walker, Perfecting
Federal Civil Rules: A Proposalfur Restricted Field Experiments, 51 Law & CONTEMI'. PRODS., Summer
1988, at 67 (arguing for field experiments before rules are given general effect).
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do.''s At least Judge Mansfield wished that comparable information
had been available to the Committee when it confronted the chal-
lenges of the 1970s, but felt that cost and the pressure for prompt
action precluded compiling it. 164 By coincidence, as the review of these
amendment proposals proceeded, then-Professor Wayne Brazil sent
the Committee his early essay on discovery,' 65 and Brazil's later empiri-
cal work1 " provided some such insights, as did a study by the Depart-
ment of Justice's Office of Improvement in the Administration of
Justice, 167 But it would be hard to conclude that this material, much of
which became available only after completion of most of the substan-
165 Thus, the Committee noted that the surveys overall results indicated that there was no
need for "fundamental change." See Advisory Committee, supra note 7, at 489. With regard to
the then-existing requirement in Rule 34 that a court order be obtained before document
production, the Committee explained its deletion of this requirement by citing the study's
conclusion that orders were not even sought in 75% of the cases where production occurred,
and that in half of those cases in which orders were sought the motions were unopposed. See id.
at 527.
164 Thus, Judge Mansfield wrote as follows to John Frank:
After Professor Rosenberg's massive Columbia Project Study, which led to the
1970 amendments to the discovery rules, I did not anticipate that any new amend-
ments would he needed at this early date. But beginning with the Pound Revisited
Conference in St. Paul in April 1976 and continuing since that time we have
encountered mounting protests by trial lawyers, clients and judges with respect to
increasing cost, harassment, delay and waste attributable to discovery, particularly
in complex litigation. At the (Flail 1976 meeting of the ABA Section on Litigation,
for instance, which was attended by some 590 registrants, the flatter was placed on
the program for discussion and the attorneys present, who represent a broad
spectrum of the trial bar (plaintiffs, defendants, large and small clients and firms),
unanimously expressed the view that discovery was being abused in practice ....
. . . I personally would have preferred to have reliable current empirical data
comparable to that assembled over a period of years and at considerable expense
by Professor Rosenberg's Columbia Project in the 1960's before deciding what
amendments, if any, should he made in the discovery rules. But I recognized that
the unanimous opinion of several hundred experienced trial lawyers from all walks
of practice was not something to be ignored.
The cost of another Columbia Project would be prohibitive. By its very nature,
moreover, the scope of discovery cannot be defined with a surgeon's precision.
Letter from Hon. Walter Mansfield, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to John P. Frank,
Lewis and Roca 1-2 (June 29, 1978) (on file with author).
165 See LMter from Wayne Brazil, Professor, University of Missouri School of Law, to Joseph
Spaniol, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (July 27, 1978) (on file with
author) (enclosing draft of essay later published as Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversarial Character of
Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978)).
166 See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems
and Abuses, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. Lifts. J. 787; Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Judicial Controls over the
Pre-trial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 A.M.
B. Foust.). REs. J. 875; Wayne a Brazil, Views From the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers
About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 ANL B. FOUND. Ras. J. 217.
107 See C. RONALD ELLINCTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE (1979).
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tive activity of the Advisory Committee, served a purpose comparable
to the Columbia Survey.
No empirical undertaking attended the 1991-93 experience, and
Professor Linda Mullenix upbraided the Advisory Committee in 1991
for its indifference to empirical inquiry about disclosure.'" Professor
Stephen Burbank observed in 1993 that the rulemakers' "studied in-
difference to empirical questions" put their work at risk of legislative
override, and went so far as to call for a moratorium on further
amendment proposals until this information gap could be filled.' 69 As
he also noted, such data might serve as an antidote to controversy and
to efforts to have Congress reconsider the Committee's proposals."°
While appreciating the need for empirical input, one needs to
realize also that there are limits to what can be learned in this fashion.
As Professor Mullenix has noted, repeated calls for empirical inquiry
can lead down a slippery slope toward inaction."' Furthermore, it is
unlikely that such efforts can provide a "scientific" assurance that a
given rule change will work.'" Even universally applauded techniques
may not be vindicated by "hard" data. For example, although it found
that a huge majority of lawyers supported the requirement that parties
first try to resolve their discovery differences before filing a motion,'"
RAND could find no hard data that the requirement produced a
measurable effect."' But measured in terms of overall litigation cost or
168 See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics
of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 816-17 & n.114, 820-21 (1991).
169 Burbank, supra note 120, at 841.
176 See id. at 849 ("just as empirical data have been an effective antidote to crisis rhetoric in
recent years ... so could they provide a neutral counter to the special pleading of the future").
171 Professor Mullenix explains:
Requests for empirical study, although invariably well-intentioned by their propo-
nents, also serve to postpone solving the problem. Empirical research is labor-in-
tensive, slow, and prone to methodological problems that encourage disputes .
[TI here should be more clear thinking about when such research truly will enhance
rule revision."
Mullenix, supra note 164, at 829.
172 1 have addressed this concern elsewhere:
[IN procedural reform could only be adopted after being proved effective and safe
in a manner similar to the way that the FDA determines whether a new drug can
be sold, it seems unlikely that there would be any formal procedural reform. The
challenge, then, is to appreciate and evaluate the pertinent polity concerns and
make reasonable use of empirical information.
Marcus, supra note 101, at 770.
175 0f 1991 respondents, 85.3% said that such a requirement was generally desirable, a
number that had swelled to 90.3% among 1993 respondents. See KARALIR ET AL., supra note 124,
at 275.
174 See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MAN-
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delay, it would be well nigh impossible for this technique to produce
an effect that would be measurable.
Moreover, survey results containing cold figures often cannot tell
the full story, and an "experiential" basis that relies on anecdotal
information is also important. That, indeed, is one possible function
of the Committee's hearing process. At the same time, it is also impor-
tant to be alert to the danger that individuals may inflate their own
experiences beyond appropriate importance.'" The Committee needs
to resist that urge, while appreciating that there is always an evaluative
element to assessing empirical input. As the Columbia Survey found:
"The more often a lawyer reports having obtained new evidence and
names of witnesses, the more often his adversary complains of aggres-
sive discovery tactics. Also, the more often a lawyer reports gaining new
information, the more likely he complains of attempted obstruction
by the adversary."'"
H. Judicial Activism Embraced: The Enduring Allure of Adult
Supervision
A final observation, in an era of managerial judging, is that turn-
ing to the judge for direction has become increasingly attractive and
important to lawyers. Although in many quarters judicial activism is
reviled, here it is not. From the beginning of this period of retrench-
ment, many have endorsed increased judicial involvement as the cure
to discovery ills. Although judicial activism on the managerial front has
undoubtedly increased in the last twenty years, the Federal Judicial
AGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA (1998),
reprinted in 39 B.C. L. Rev. 613 (1998) (in this issue).
175 The Committee's own files provide an ironic example of seemingly overagressive gener-
alization. The very researcher who headed up the Columbia Study in the 1960s and concluded,
contrary to fears expressed by some based on anecdotal information, that lawyers had not become
unduly adversarial in their use of discovery, GLASER, supra note 8, at 233-34, wrote to the
Committee in 1980 to ask whether further amendments to the discovery rules had been adopted.
His reason for inquiring was revealing:
Recently I had an experience that none of us seemed to have had in 1966 [when
the Columbia Study was being completed]—viz. I have been a client in a civil law
suit. This is a perspective altogether different_ from the one we had then, and it is
quite a shock. 'file behavior of lawyers in specific cases is appalling.
Letter from William A. Glaser, Columbia University, to Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure 1 (June 20, 1980) (on file with author). He went on to urge consideration of the client
perspective, often missing front attorney surveys. See id. Much as the client view would allow a
valuable perspective, one nevertheless is inclined to conclude that even this veteran researcher
leaped too quickly from his specific experience to a general conclusion about lawyer behavior.
176 GLASER, supra note 8, at 87.
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Center study found that it still ranks as the most popular method
among lawyers for further improvement of discovery practice."'
V. CONCLUSION
In 1906, Pound warned against "petty tinkering."'" In his address
entitled Agenda for 2000 A.D. at the 1976 Pound Conference, Chief
Justice Burger invoked Pound: "[W]e must probe for fundamental
changes and major overhaul rather than simply 'tinkering."'" A
month later, this message was relayed to the Advisory Committee, and
linked to review of discovery.'" The year 2000 will be upon us before
further amendments to the discovery rules can go into effect."' So it
is fair to ask whether the changes thus far fit the Chief Justice's pre-
scription.
The answer is fairly clearly yes, albeit in the sense of containment
rather than rejection of the basic impulse toward full exchange of per-
tinent information. The 1980 amendments were criticized, of course,
as falling far short of what was needed. 182 The 1983 amendments,
however, were considerably more ambitious. One of the members of
the ABA Special Committee said that these were "grandchildren of
Pound's thought."'" He elaborated:
If our proposals were designed to sound the trumpet of a new
day, the Judicial Conference has written a horn concerto.
Whatever else may be said about them, it certainly cannot be
said of these proposals that they tinker. On the contrary, if as
177 See FJC Study, supra note 124, at 587 tbl. 36.
178 Pound, supra note 1, at 403.
1 " Burger, supra note 1, at 93.
1811 See Agenda for the Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, supra note 32,
at 1 (Agenda Item 2 quoting Burger).
181
 The earliest that a preliminary draft of proposed further amendments to the discovery
rules could be published for public comment is mid-1998. That commentary period would likely
include public hearings and be open into early 1999. Thereafter, the Advisory Committee would
need to meet and consider the advice received during the commentary period. If it decided to
proceed with amendments, those would be reported to the Judicial Conference's Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and if it concluded the amendments were
worthwhile, the committee would forward them to the Judicial Conference for approval. Should
the Judicial Conference also apprOve the amendments, they would probably be submitted to the
Supreme Court no sooner than some time in the Fall of 1999, and the Court probably would not
take action on them until the Spring of 2000. Thereafter, assuming the Court transmitted
proposed amendments to Congress by May 1, 2000, those amendments could go into effect on
December 1, 2000 unless Congress acted to change them or delay their effective date. See 28
U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994).
182 See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
1 " Flegal, supra note 95, at 48 (quoting Steven Umin).
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Pound said "petty tinkering" is the product of a "lack of
general ideas or legal philosophy," the Advisory Committee's
proposals reflect Pound's kind of thinking in the large about
the pretrial process as a whole and the role of courts in it. 1"
Certainly the 1993 amendments went beyond tinkering as well, so
that we can comfortably say that the rules regarding discovery have
been fundamentally retooled in an effort to contain discovery without
abandoning the fundamental commitment to affording broad access
to needed information. Thus, compared to the rules as they existed
before the 1980 amendments, the current rule provisions are markedly
altered:
• No longer do the rules invite unlimited use of discovery absent
a protective order; to the contrary, they direct the court to limit dis-
proportionate discovery;
• Use of both interrogatories and depositions is subject to pre-
sumptive numerical limitations;
• Before formal discovery begins, counsel are directed to meet
and confer to confect a discovery plan that should be submitted to the
court before its Rule 16 conference;
• Rule 16 directs the court to enter a scheduling order that limits
the time to complete discovery;
• Before formal discovery begins, the parties are directed to dis-
close material relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity;
• Expert witnesses are required to provide highly detailed reports
on their testimony and then are subject to depositions by the opposing
party as a matter of right;
• During depositions, it is permissible to instruct a witness not to
answer only on privilege grounds or other very narrow grounds;
• Parties who withhold material from disclosure or discovery on
claims of privilege are required to provide a detailed basis for this
action;
• Parties producing documents must do so either in the order in
which the materials are usually kept or in the order of the discovering
party's document requests;
• Supplementation of discovery responses, formerly quite nar-
row,'" now applies to both disclosure and discovery whenever a party
"learns that in some material respect the information is incomplete or
incorrect."
184 1d. at 97.
185 Except for questions directed to the identity of witnesses, before 1993 Rule 26(e) required
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The foregoing catalogues only some of the changes the Advisory
Committee has made in the past twenty years. Whether it moved
beyond tinkering in 1983 or 1993, the reality is that it has done so. Yet
unhappiness about discovery endures; the Federal Judicial Center
("FJC") study in 1997 found that more than eighty percent of respond-
ing attorneys felt that further changes needed to be made to deal with
enduring problems. 186 Perhaps that statistic can be partially attributed
to something else Pound mentioned—that there is inherently some
dissatisfaction with civil adjudication.'" Given the scope of the changes
to date, it suggests that rule revisions may never solve all discovery
problems, or perhaps even most of those that remain. However that
may be, the questions for the future are both whether to make further
changes and whether to gravitate toward the tinkering or the funda-
mental end of the spectrum in any changes that are made.
correction only of responses "known" to be incorrect when made or, where correct when made,
if failure to supplement would be in substance a knowing concealment."
188 See FJC Study, supra note 124, at 543.
187 See Pound, supra note 1, at 395-97.
Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice is as old as law . . . [A]I] legal
systems among all peoples have given rise to the same complaints .... It is obvious,
therefore, that there must be some cause or causes inherent in all law and all legal
systems in order to produce this universal and invariable effect.
Id. at 395, 397.
